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Who is Willing to Die for the Constitution?  
The National Debate on the Constitutional Treaty in Poland.  
 
Aleksandra Wyrozumska 
 
During the Brussels summit of December 2003, the representatives of the Polish 
government staunchly defended the weighted vote issue that had been agreed at the Nice 
summit in December 2000. With the famous slogan “Nice or Death” they favoured the 
Nice Treaty which they believed to be representing Polish national interests better than the 
project of the Constitution. Even though this position was intensively debated in the 
national media, the debate on European Constitutional ratification turned out to be a 
relatively low-key affair. Polish political actors were simply not willing to stake their 
political reputations for the document they were opposing or at least not fully convinced 
of. Eventually, when the French and Dutch voted no, there was no political actor in Poland 
willing to “die” for the Constitution, not even among the ranks of its former (although not 
very vociferous) supporters. As Klotzle put it, 
 
“Given the near hysteria of the Polish political debate during the final negotiations of the 
constitution last year - featuring heated arguments over voting rights and references to 
Europe’s Christian heritage, as well as the impassioned conservative-nationalist slogan 
‘Nice or Death’ - the reaction to the French referendum has been relatively mild.”1 
 
In fact, the Nice system has been defended across the entire political spectrum (left and 
right wing parties) in terms of national political interests and the principle of ‘equal 
treatment’ in the EU – but not an anti-EU nationalism.2 After the loss of strategic partner, 
Spain, Poland’s bargaining power was dramatically curtailed. Already before, the tough 
position of the Polish government was met with criticism among the old EU member 
states. Hence, not wishing to be seen as the sole constitutional opponent, Poland accepted a 
compromise. Not surprisingly, the Constitution was not meet with much enthusiasm in the 
Polish Parliament. Although the Sejm (the Upper Hause) decided to put the document to 
national referendum, the public debate was not really  initiated.  
 
The political elite was more interested to observe the other countries’ reactions, some 
undoubtedly secretly hoping that another state would reject the Constitution before the 
Polish referendum had a chance to take place. Others thought that the chances of their 
success in the forthcoming elections would be increased if the referendum coincided with 
parliamentary or presidential elections. At the same time, politicians and members of the 
                                                 
1 “After the French “non”: Poland Reacts with Sangfroid” by Kurt Klotzle, Centrum für Angewandte Politik, 
CAP, http://www.cap-lmu.de/themen/eu-reform/ratifikation/polen.php  
2 See “Constitutional Referendum in Poland. Can the Popular Will Overcome Party Power Struggles?” by 
Kurt Klotzle, Centrum für Angewandte Politik, CAP, http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/positionen/2005/ 
poland.php. 
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media alike seemed uninterested in giving a fair account of the issues that the referendum 
would decide. Overall, there was little attempt by either group to ‘bring the Constitution 
closer to the citizenry’ in a systematic and a non-demagogic manner. 
 
The relevant social survey data confirms that the Constitution was a low-profile issue in 
Poland. In a survey of “the most important events of 2005 for Poland and the world” 
conducted in January 2006 by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), the issue of 
the European Constitution was not mentioned at all3. In the opinion of those surveyed, the 
most important events of 2005 had been the Polish parliamentary and presidential elections 
(53%) and the death of the Pope John Paul II (35%). While the matter of the Constitution 
was largely ignored by the Polish public, the same attitude to EU matters had not been 
evident in previous years. In 2002 for example the survey showed that, according to public 
opinion, the most important events had been the completion of accession negotiations 
(60%) and the Pope’s visit to Poland (18%). In 2003, it had been the accession referendum 
(58%) and the Polish mission in Iraq (8%), and, in 2004, Polish accession to the EU (62%) 
and political corruption at home (8%). 
 
Media discourse analysis shows that the constitutional process was discussed by the Polish 
media in three distinct ways. The normative debate, lead by academics, experts and 
journalists, examined the Constitution against the various different visions of the future of 
the European Union. This emphasis on the long term meant that the normative debate had a 
uniquely forward-looking character. The electoral debate, dominated by the journalists and 
politicians, discussed the Constitution in relation to domestic politics, which at that time 
chiefly revolved around the national elections. The electoral debate fulfilled instrumental 
functions, domesticating constitutional topics in the electoral campaigns.  The cross-border 
debate, having receptive functions, was employed to report on the constitutional debates in 
other member states. The media actors, experts, or academics were therefore ‘introducing’ 
foreign debates to the Polish public. These three debates were also resonating with 
different cleavages or conflicting visions of Europe. In the normative debate different 
actors were evaluating the Constitution in relation to the question of politicization of the 
EU (stronger or weaker) or a future vision of Europe (liberal vs. social). The electoral 
debate, on the other hand, merged constitutional topics with the electoral campaigns of the 
left and right wing parties4, whilst the cross-border one frequently referred to the gap 
between the elites and citizens or conflicting national interests in the EU.  
 
                                                 
3 “Najważniejsze wydarzenia 2005 roku dla Polski i świata”, report based on research by Michał 
Strzeszewski, Warszawa, January 2005, www.cbos.pl  
4 The major parties referred to in the text are, left: The Left Wing Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, 
SLD), Social Democratic Party of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Polska, SDPL), Labour Union (Unia Pracy, 
UP). Center- right: Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), right: Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość, PIS). Populist: agrarian Self-defense (Samoobrona, S). Radical right wing, catholic: The 
League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR).  
Aleksandra Wyrozumska Who is Willing to Die for the Constitution? 
 3
In the short period between the debates on accession to the EU (2002/3) and the 
Constitutional Treaty (2004), the parties opposing EU accession (The League of Polish 
Families) or advocating renegotiation of the terms of membership (Self-Defence), shifted 
towards moderate support of the EU. Having accepted Polish membership in the EU, these 
parties have nonetheless remained reluctant to accept deeper political integration of the 
EU. Accordingly, in autumn 2004 not a single party opposed Polish membership of the 
EU.  
 
I. Data 
Empirical research for this project was conducted in the period from the 28th October 2004 
to the 31st October 2005. In comparison to Western European states such as France or the 
UK, the level of media coverage of the issue was not particularly high in Poland, with the 
tabloid media being the least interested in the constitutional topics, as illustrated by the 
case of the newspaper Super Express, which contributed a total of just seven articles to the 
media debate. 
 
Given the media selection, the main criteria were, firstly, to take into account the most 
influential media in Poland5 and, secondly, to be properly representative of the Polish 
political spectrum. For that reason, not only were those left- or right-wing publications 
with the largest circulation selected, but also representatives of the more marginal Catholic 
media, constituting an interesting voice in the debate on the EU Constitution. Statistical 
data on circulation and public influence were obtained from reports by the Media 
Monitoring Institute as well as from the media in question. Secondary literature (Kitschelt, 
1999; Grabowska, 2004) including other empirical analyses of the constitutional debate in 
Poland (Gaisbauer, 2006) were consulted to ensure a representative picture of political 
divisions in the national media. 
 
Traditionally, media discourse analyses in Poland are based on the contents of the centre-
left paper Gazeta Wyborcza and the centre-right Rzeczpospolita. For example, in his study 
of the constitutional debate in Poland Gaisbauer used these two dailies, albeit 
supplementing this somewhat limited selection by including the tabloid Super Express. 
Gaisbauer correctly established that coverage of the Constitution in the tabloids was 
incredibly small in comparison to that offered by the “quality” media,6 information which 
would seem to support the theory that the EU Constitution was not of equal interest to all 
socio-economic strata of the Polish public. However, the data he used is by no means 
sufficient if one wishes to examine the true variety of positions on the Constitution in 
Poland. Therefore, this case study has been based not only on the largest dailies and 
                                                 
5 According to a report by the Media Monitoring Institute from 2004 (Instytut Monitorowania Mediow 
“Ranking najbardziej opiniotworczych polskich mediow w 2004 roku”, Warszawa, luty 2005).  
6 7 articles appeared in the tabloid Super Express in comparison to over 150 in Gazeta Wyborcza and 
Rzeczpospolita.  
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tabloids but also on the weeklies, mainstream and also so-called sectoral. While secondary 
literature on the subject recognizes that these are the long and substantive editorials 
published in the weeklies that ‘set the agenda’ especially for EU-topics (Kevin, 2003; 
Trenz, 2004), the sectoral media provide researchers with equally important although (or 
even precisely because) marginal or radical voices in any given debate. 
 
The terms ‘left’ or ‘right’ are used in this article to describe the political orientation of the 
actors in the context of the Polish debate on the EU Constitution. It needs to be noted, 
however, that in the Polish (and, more generally, the Central European) context these terms 
have specific connotations that are missing in Western European usage. Herbert Kitschelt 
(Kitschelt, 1999; Markowski, 2002) noted that the political space of the Central European, 
post-communist state is organized along the nexus ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ cross-cuting 
with the nexus ‘market-liberal economy versus state welfare.’ In the Polish context it is 
possible to be even more specific and identify three such constitutive nexuses (Grabowska, 
2004): the attitude towards the communist past (strong de-communization versus 
forgiveness), the economy (welfare state versus market economy) and value systems 
(secularism/liberalism versus Christian values). For many people one of the three aspects is 
more important than another, and therefore, it is not necessary for all three dimensions to 
be in play in every particular case. One or two of the three intersecting dimensions that 
mark out Poland’s political space can provide sufficient reason for any given voter to 
support a particular party. Interestingly, with the economic stagnation of the late nineties 
and an unemployment rate of almost 20%, all of the major parties became more ‘social’. 
The major difference is that the welfare policies of the left-wing parties7 traditionally 
reflect secular values while those of the right wing parties reflect what might be called 
Christian values.8 
 
These tendencies are also evident in the Polish media. For instance, although Newsweek 
Polska is owned by Axel Springer, the profile of the weekly is very liberal, targeting young 
and educated people. And, as such, Newsweek draws on secular values; it promotes the 
principles of the market economy within a Polish context and has an indifferent attitude 
towards the communist past. On the other hand, the Catholic Tygodnik Powszechny is a 
high-quality, sectoral journal targeting the Christian intelligentsia. At least thirty per cent 
of its coverage is devoted to the affairs of the Catholic Church, but its articles covering 
secular issues are also insightful and of a high standard. While Tygodnik Powszechny 
undoubtedly promotes Christian values, it has at the same time a more liberal attitude 
                                                 
7 For instance the Left Wing Alliance or the Labor Union.  
8 Family policy is a case in point: left-wing parties are concerned with women’s rights, and traditionally 
subsidize contraceptives or focus on enhancing tolerance towards sexual minorities in public life. The right-
wing parties (especially Law and Justice and the radical Catholic League of Polish Families) prefer instead to 
subsidize families with children (‘becikowe’ is the Polish equivalent of children’s allowance) and in general 
promote Catholic values in family life.  
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towards the communist past than some right-wing parties.9 Therefore we must bear in mind 
that very few if any of the newspapers on the Polish market represent an ‘ideal case’ in 
terms of right- or left-wing political orientation. Moreover, proponents of a welfare state at 
national level may frequently advocate a strongly market-oriented Europe. In short, 
divisions at the level of national politics are not automatically mirrored at EU level. 
 
A selection of 699 articles was taken from eight journals; three dailies, three weeklies, a 
tabloid and a special supplement of a daily tabloid. The three dailies in question were 
Rzeczpospolita with its centre-right orientation, the left-of-centre Gazeta Wyborcza and the 
sectoral Catholic-populist Nasz Dziennik. The three weeklies examined were Wprost, the 
leftist-liberal Newsweek (Polish edition) and the sectoral liberal-Catholic Tygodnik 
Powszechny. 10 The research sample also included the tabloid Super Express and the 
special supplement Europa, part of the daily tabloid Fakt.11 Europa includes re-prints of 
articles written by well-known scholars such as Habermas, a strategy which, while it may 
lower the number of Polish contributors on the one hand, on the other provides an 
important insight into the non-Polish thought in Poland. 
 
The Catholic public in Poland is divided into a ‘moderate-liberal’ camp representing the 
official position of the Catholic Church and a ‘radical’ camp which is in conflict with the 
Church authorities. The weekly Tygodnik Powszechny, our example of high-quality 
sectoral journalism, belongs to the moderate camp while the populist daily Nasz Dziennik 
belongs to the radical. The reason for selecting two Catholic journals from opposing camps 
was to establish whether the Catholic media converged or diverged on the topic of the EU 
Constitution. For a closer qualitative analysis, 29 substantive articles were selected from 
the whole set.12 The selection strategy was three-fold: the sample was proportionate to the 
media coverage each month and it was composed of articles that were substantive or very 
relevant to the domestic discussion. In addition, the sample included articles dealing with 
important constitutional events which took place during the period of research (see 
Appendix 1-3).  
                                                 
9 In the early nineties Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first democratically elected Prime Minister and a long-term 
contributor to Tygodnik Powszechny advocated the drawing of a ‘red line’ between the communist past and 
the democratic present. His message was clear: the past should be ‘closed’ and we should all focus on 
building democracy in the future. The largest right-wing party, Law and Justice, is in favor of radical 
reexamination of public persons’ activities during the communist period.  
10 Initially the leftist weekly Polityka was going to be included; however, the journal’s internet archives were 
unavailable during the period of data gathering. 
11 Since spring 2006 the supplement Europa has appeared as part of the new Axel-Springer daily Dziennik.  
12 The qualitative analysis was conducted using Atlas.ti software. 
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Figure 1: Media coverage of the constitutional debate in Poland by week, October 2004 to October 2005 
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Although coverage in the weeklies was not exactly extensive, the articles themselves 
discussing the constitutional process were quite substantive and evaluative. It was also a 
feature of the sectoral Nasz Dziennik that many academic terms such as politicization were 
misunderstood and misused. For that reason the categorisation (“coding”) of such 
statements created many difficulties. In addition, one of the authors who contributed 
regularly to Nasz Dziennik would change his position on such crucial issues as support for 
the Polish EU membership literally from one article to the next. This in turn generated 
problems as far as pinpointing Nasz Dziennik’s position on Polish ‘support for the EU’ was 
concerned. The lack of consistency also indicated that some authors may merely have been 
echoing third-party opinions which, to make matters worse, they had not fully understood. 
In general it became evident that in the Polish media the European Constitution and the 
constitutional process did not feature high on the national agenda, neither in comparison to 
domestic issues (the presidential and parliamentary elections) nor in relation to EU 
accession. 
 
II. Analysis 
II.1 Actors 
The major findings from the analysis of the actors who were instrumental in the debate are 
as follows: firstly, there was a low level of diversity among the Polish actors involved and, 
secondly, there was a low degree of personalization in the debate. The Polish debate was 
basically the domain of three types of actor: journalists, experts/academics, and executives. 
High-profile actors in the cross-border discussion were heads of states or party leaders 
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while the EU level remained dominated by top-ranking officials. Non-governmental actors 
like NGOs were basically absent in the debate. Although voters/public were well 
represented in the debate, in terms of direct involvement they played a very passive role. 
The opinions of the Polish public were mostly represented by the other actors involved 
who frequently relied on social survey data. Foreign public opinion was represented but 
mostly in relation to referenda that were taking place abroad. Hence, in the Polish 
constitutional debate neither the public nor non-governmental organizations set the 
agenda. Seen in this light, the Polish debate had a strongly elitist character. 
 
The low level of personalization, on the other hand, can be attributed to the fact that 
proponents of the Constitution were even less willing to promote the Treaty by name than 
its opponents. Before the elections too much was at risk for politicians to stake their 
personal reputations and good names on a project the outcome of which was very 
uncertain. Therefore, as long as parties had (strategically) announced their positions on the 
Constitution, individual actors were fairly reluctant to become personally engaged to the 
extent that, say, Jacques Chirac or Vaclav Klaus were. 
 
Table 1: Origin of Actors 
 
 
 
Table 2: Types of Actor 
 
 
The electoral debate was dominated by political actors. For executives and party members, 
the Constitution was merely a vote-seeking or office-securing device. Therefore, instead of 
‘educational’ campaigning, they often preferred simply to mirror their constituencies’ 
preferences, well aware that while the issue of the Constitution could not entirely change 
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the outcome of an election, it could certainly sway it a little. So, for instance, the left-wing 
parties knew that their constituencies were strongly pro-European. The parties’ support for 
the Constitution therefore was expected to pay off during the parliamentary and 
presidential elections because the issue would provide the undecided, potential left-wing 
electorate with an additional incentive to vote. After the corruption scandals of 2001/2, the 
legitimacy of left-wing parties had been seriously undermined as far as domestic issues 
were concerned. So, by supporting the Constitution, the left-wing parties hoped to win 
back some of their electorate and also to attract right-wing Constitutional proponents. The 
situation was entirely different at the right end of the political spectrum. In the 
constituencies of the liberal conservative Civic Platform, there was moderate support for 
the Constitution, so the party distanced itself from its former radically negative position on 
the issue, preferring instead to adopt a neutral stance.13 The other important right-wing 
party, Law and Justice, did not face a similar problem. Their anti-constitutional stance 
already reflected the preferences of their eurosceptical constituency. 
 
Table 3: Actors by political affiliation. 
 
 
The former President, Aleksander Kwasniewski, also participated in the constitutional 
discussion, advocating scheduling of the referendum to coincide with the first round of the 
presidential elections. After the French “No”, Aleksander Kwasniewski became one of the 
champions of a Europe-wide referendum on the redrafted Constitutional Treaty, more 
precisely on the shorter version of the document. In contrast, other constitutional 
proponents in Poland were not interested in discussing alternative options. Rather, they 
preferred to withdraw this touchy topic entirely from the electoral agenda. Finally, since 
the elections in autumn 2005 both the parliamentary majority and the new President Lech 
Kaczyński have been openly against the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Jan Rokita, one of the party’s key figures, was the author of the slogan “Nice or Death”.  
Actor name No % of total No % of articles 
Extreme left - - - - 
Left 20 40 8 28 
Right 21 42 8 28 
Extreme right 3 6 3 10 
Liberals 5 10 3 10 
Greens 1 2 1 3 
Total 50 100 29 100 
* no of times the origin was coded in the articles
** no of articles that include actors of a given origin
Occurrence* No of articles** 
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Table 4: Top 10 named actors. 
 
Table 5: Attitudes to the constitution and preferred date for the referendum.14 
                                                 
14 Based on press analysis. 
in % of in % of 
Actor name Position Origin Total total no. articles
Rostowski, Jacek against PL 9 15 1 3 
Chirac, Jacques for PL 6 10 4 14 
Juncker, Jean-Claude for LUX 6 10 5 17 
Kwasniewski, Aleksander for F 6 10 5 17 
Barroso, Jose Manuel for EU 5 8 4 14 
Blair, Tony for UK 5 8 3 10 
Brok, Elmar for EU 5 8 1 3 
Belka, Marek for D 2 3 2 7 
Saryusz-Wolski, Jacek for E 2 3 1 3 
Schroeder, Gerhard for UK 2 3 2 7 
Total 60 100 29 100 
* no of times the actor was coded in the articles
** no of articles that include the respective actor
No. of articles** Occurrence*
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Political party/Important actor Attitude to the Constitution (advocative  
strategy)  
Date of the referendum 
The Left Wing Alliance (Left) FOR To coincide with the 1st round of the 
presidential elections, autumn 2005. 
The Social Democratic Party (Left) FOR To coincide with the 1st round of the 
presidential elections, autumn 2005. 
The Labor Union (Left) FOR To coincide with the 1st round of the 
presidential elections, autumn 2005. 
Civic Platform  (Central, liberal) NEUTRAL If necessary, spring 2006, otherwise latest 
possible date. Separate referendum.  
Law and Justice (Right) AGAINST The latest possible date (maybe some 
other state will have rejected the 
constitution by this time). Separate 
referendum 
League of Polish Families (Catholic, 
conservative) 
AGAINST The latest possible date (maybe some 
other state will have rejected the 
constitution by this time). Separate 
referendum 
Self-defense (populist) AGAINST The latest possible date (maybe some 
other state will have rejected the 
constitution by this time). Separate 
referendum 
Polish Peasant Party AGAINST Autumn 2006 to coincide with local 
elections. 
Kwasniewski, Aleksander (former 
President) 
FOR To coincide with the 1st round of the 
presidential elections, autumn 2005. 
Kaczyński, Lech (current President, 
Dec.2005) 
AGAINST The latest possible date (maybe some 
other state will have rejected the 
constitution by this time). Separate 
referendum.  
Pubic opinion survey FOR (between 10/2004-10/2005 
fluctuating around 50%, highest support- 
68%- source: CBOS) 
43%- independently of all elections, 17%- 
to coincide with the parliamentary 
elections, 21%- to coincide with the 
presidential elections, 
10%- to coincide with local elections, 
8%- difficult to say 
Parliamentary majority (after elections 
Autumn 2005) 
AGAINST If a new draft of the constitution was put 
forward, the latest possible term to 
schedule a referendum in Poland.  
 
The national and non-national actors shaping the Polish discussion on the Constitution did 
not change over time. However, while the actors remained the same for the whole research 
period, there were phases when some would play a more dominant role in the debate than 
others. For instance, in the period from autumn 2003 to spring 2004 the electoral debate 
was mostly dominated by journalists, executives and political parties. After the French 
“No”, experts, journalists, and members of the public (the latter generally only as passive 
agents) dominated the discussion with their cross-border and normative debates. 
 
II.2 Constitutional Topics 
In order to understand the limited diversity of constitutional topics included in the national 
debate, it is necessary to look at the background to the Polish position on the Constitution. 
It is possible to identify four phases in the Polish debate on the Constitution (Koenig, 
2005). In the first one, between October and December 2003, Poland stated its official 
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position and established an alliance with Spain, who was also against any change to the 
voting rules enshrined in the Nice Treaty. Poland entered the negotiations with the famous 
slogan “Nice or Death”, which eventually blocked the negotiations. In general terms, 
Poland was in favour of the Constitution but a condition of its support was that the 
following changes be made: (a) that a religious reference be included in the preamble, (b) 
that there be one commissioner per state, (c) that, in terms of security policy, NATO 
provide the basis for EU security and (d) that the voting rules laid out in the Nice Treaty be 
adopted (the most important provision). 
 
Table 6: Types of constitutional topic. 
 
 
In the second phase, between March and June 2004, Poland lost its strategic partner, Spain. 
After the parliamentary elections in Spain, the new Prime Minister Zapatero was open to 
compromise and decided to support the double majority voting rule. Poland was concerned 
that if the government continued to insist upon the Nice voting rules, Poland would be 
alienated from the other EU member states, so eventually the national representation 
accepted a compromise. In the third phase the national debate concentrated on the timing 
of the Polish referendum and its alternative scheduling to coincide with the parliamentary, 
presidential, or local elections in autumn 2005/spring 2006. In that phase the timing of the 
referendum was a highly politicized issue. First of all, political actors were afraid that the 
turn-out for the referendum might be poor (in other words, below 50%) and - given the 
reputation that Poland had earned during negotiations over the weighted votes – that this 
would eventually make Poland a black sheep in the eyes of the rest of the EU. Secondly, 
scheduling the constitutional referendum to coincide with the presidential elections was 
expected to shift the balance of votes in favour of the left-wing candidate. For this reason, 
political parties had widely differing opinions on the most suitable date for the referendum. 
Finally, a fourth phase began with the French rejection of the Constitution, during which 
period the electoral debate in Poland was displaced by the normative and cross-border 
discourses. The emphasis shifted towards evaluation of the arguments used by other 
national publics. The table below shows the sequence of EU and related national events 
during the period under research. 
 
Table 7: Key events in the Polish constitutional debate. 
Time EU event National reception of the EU event 
Oct 2004- Signing of the constitutional treaty in 
Rome 
• Constitution badly translated into Polish 
• Parties announce their positions on the constitution, 
Topic type No % of total No % of articles 
Constitution as such 111 27 25 86
Substantive topics 77 19 19 66
Constitutional process 221 54 24 83
Total 409 100 29 100 
* no of times the issue type was coded in the articles
** no of articles that include a certain issue type
Occurrence* No of articles** 
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constitution as an electoral vote-seeking device.  
• Timing of the Polish referendum (scheduled to 
coincide with presidential /parliamentary elections or 
to take place separately?)  
• “Constitution as a German-French dictate”, 
“Constitution deprives nation-states of sovereignty”- 
different interpretations of the treaty 
 
Feb 2005- Spanish referendum • Hypothetical consequences of the Polish “No” vote 
• Constitution and Nice Treaty from the perspective of 
national interests 
• Constitution criticized for being unclear and incoherent 
 
May 2005- French referendum • Interpreting the French “No”: context mattered, not the 
constitution itself 
• Constitution in the context of services directive and the 
French rejection 
• Constitution promoting a particular vision of Europe: 
social or liberal? 
June 2005- Dutch referendum • Visions of Europe: predominant support for the liberal 
one. 
July 2005- Luxembourg referendum • Visions of Europe: predominant support for the liberal 
one 
June 2005- Lux presidency, reflection period • Alternative options out of crisis from the perspective of 
national interests. 
 
Sep 2005- British presidency • Intergovernmental “coalition building”: Polish actors 
advocating a Polish-British-German alliance. The 
French vision of Europe  considered as being against 
Polish economic interest 
 Parliamentary ratifications in other 
member states 
• Impact on Polish voters  
 
In sum, general constitutional topics predominated. Furthermore, the constitutional process 
earned more coverage than particular provisions of the Constitution. For instance, the 
general code “Constitution” accounts for 27% of all topics covered by the print media, 
whilst Constitutional process account for 56%. This latter figure also includes discussion 
of the timing of the referendum in Poland. The topic translation of the Constitution, being 
an unusually important issue in the Polish debate, accounts for no less than 19% of all 
topics covered by newspapers.  
 
Table 9: Top 10 single substantive issues. 
 
 
Single topics No % of total No % of articles
Translation of the Constitution 12 16 2 7  Definition of the Union 9 12 4 14  Common Agriculture and fisheries 7 9 4 14  Free movement of persons and services 6 8 3 10  Union’s objectives 4 5 1 3  Common foreign and security policy 3 4 2 7  Ratification and entry into force 3 4 3 10  Christian/Christian inheritance 2 3 2 7  Union competences - supremacy 2 3 1 3  Council President 2 3 1 3
C.04.03. Council President
Total 77 100 29 100
* no of times the topic was coded in the articles 
** no of articles that include a given topic code
Occurrence* No of articles**
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II.3 Argumentative Strategies 
Analysis of the Polish media reveals that three distinct argumentative strategies were used 
in coverage of the constitutional issue. The ‘quality publication’ group consisting of 
Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, Newsweek, Wprost, Europa and Tygodnik Powszechny 
attempted to give objective although not always very detailed accounts. In comparison to 
the ‘highbrow’ press, the tabloid media, as exemplified by Super Express, barely covered 
constitutional topics at all. In general, the tabloid press articles provided only brief and 
cursory coverage of the subject. The sectoral Nasz Dziennik developed a distinctive 
argumentative strategy in this context. Its approach combined a suspicious attitude towards 
EU issues with a lack of consistency in terms of its position on any given topic. With the 
exception of definitive statements on the subject of an EU constitution, which were most 
often made by experts or academics writing for the quality press, the other argumentative 
strategies were used by basically all the actors taking part in the Polish debate. However, 
the presentation of constitutional topics differed according to whether they were being 
covered by the quality, tabloid or sectoral-populist media. This section will provide some 
examples of typical usage of the various argumentative strategies in the different 
publication types. 
 
 
Table 10: Types of statements by category. 
Statement categories No % of total No % of articles
Definitive 9 2 6 21
Designative 55 15 21 72
Evaluative 144 38 25 86
  positive 19 5 10 34
  negative 74 20 21 72
  important/influential 26 7 13 45
  unimportant/uninfluential 7 2 4 14
  easy 0 0 0 0
  difficult 10 3 6 21
  neutral/undecided/ambivalent 8 2 8 28
Advocative 169 45 28 97
  for 98 26 23 79
  against 71 19 24 83
Total 377 100 29 100
Positive/for 117 31 26 90
Negative/against 145 38 27 93
* no of times the argumentative strategy was coded in the articles
** no of articles that include the respective argumentative strategy
Occurrence* No of articles**
 
 
The following examples demonstrate different usages of definitive statements in the 
quality press and sectoral-populist media respectively. The definitive statements used in 
quality press were precise and coherent though the topic was not always clearly delineated. 
Nasz Dziennik, on the contrary, had a tendency to very expressionistic but also 
superstitious definitive statements.  
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“The Constitution is a balanced text - it is neither ultraliberal nor does it seek to impose 
a social model.” (“The liberal-democratic vision of Europe”, Graham Watson, Gazeta 
Wyborcza).15 
 
“[The Constitution] undermines the sovereignty of nation states and national 
constitutions, creating in their place a European super-state” (“A cabinet-
constitution,” Goss, Małgorzta, Nasz Dziennik).16 
 
“In short, the text of the Constitutional Treaty states clearly that after the 1st of 
November, 2006 we shall lose our sovereignty and freedom as a state, and will maintain 
a degree of autonomy similar to that of a province or a county. We will be like one of 
the states of the United States of America or Brazil, or a Swiss canton. However, the 
true extent of our inferiority cannot be fully gauged at this moment in time, because the 
Euro-constitution is still evolving in certain respects and the number of decisions, acts 
and regulations is steadily growing, making it impossible for a Pole to escape from it or 
to preserve his freedom or dignity. (“A euro-constitution deprives us of our freedom”, 
Fr. Bartnik, Nasz Dziennik).17 
 
 
Designative statements were most often used to report on an event such as a signing 
summit. While the statements in the quality press were very focused on the issue, the 
tabloid press often combined a sentence or paragraph on an official EU event with informal 
information such as celebrity gossip. Finally, designative statements found in Nasz 
Dziennik contained vocabulary that was far from neutral, referring, for example, to a 
European super-state. 
 
“Support for the European Constitution in Poland is small. Only every third 
respondent is in favour of the Constitution.” (“A weak yes to the Constitution”, 
Stankiewicz, Andrzej, Rzeczpospolita).18 
 
“The document [the Constitution] was signed by the Prime Minister Marek Belka (52 
years old) and the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. While 
                                                 
15 “Jest tekstem wyważonym - ani ultraliberalnym, ani narzucającym model socjalny.” 
16 “Likwiduje suwerenność państw narodowych i przekreśla narodowe konstytucje, powołując w to miejsce 
superpaństwo europejskie.” 
 
17 “Krótko mówiąc, treść traktatu konstytucji europejskiej zapowiada dosyć wyraźnie, że po 1 listopada 2006 
roku tracimy suwerenność i wolność jako państwo, a zachowamy pewną autonomię typu regionu, landu czy 
stanu. Będziemy jak jeden ze stanów Ameryki lub Brazylii czy też jak kanton Szwajcarii. Przy tym 
rozmiarów naszego poddaństwa Unii nie da się obecnie określić bardzo precyzyjnie, gdyż eurokonstytucja 
jeszcze się ciągle w pewnych punktach kształtuje i narasta wtórna lawina rozporządzeń, aktów 
wykonawczych, przepisów, spod których żaden Polak nie będzie się mógł wydobyć ani uratować swojej 
godności i wolności.” 
18 “Małe poparcie Polaków dla unijnej konstytucji. Za jej przyjęciem opowiada się jedynie co trzeci z nas.” 
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the head of government was signing the Constitution, his wife Krystyna was sightseeing 
in Rome. She walked through the streets of the Trastevere, a poor, working-class 
neighbourhood of the Eternal City.” (“Europe finally has a constitution,” Kamiński, 
Wojciech, Super Express).19 
 
“Despite the objections of the majority of opposition parties, the Council of Ministers 
yesterday agreed to sign the European Constitution, which will unite all the nation-
states into a single European super-state.” (“Europe in crucible,” Goss, Małgorzata, 
Nasz Dziennik).20 
 
Evaluative statements (both negative and positive) were less emotional in the quality and 
tabloid press than in Nasz Dziennik. The tabloids also often used vernacular or even vulgar 
language. The following examples illustrate well the usage of evaluative negative and 
advocative statements in the Polish quality media, tabloids and the sectoral paper Nasz 
Dziennik. 
 
“It was meant to be a text that would inspire the people, giving them to understand 
that they are part of a European family. Instead, it was written in bureaucratic Euro-
jargon, like a poorly-written instruction manual.” (“Like a poorly-written instruction 
manual,” Bielecki, Jędrzej, Rzeczpospolita). 
 
“The idea has long since been supported by the left wing, which is unanimously in 
favour of a European Constitution. According to the spokesman of the SLD Marek 
Dyduch, the best option would be to schedule the referendum to coincide with the 
first round of the presidential elections. This would force the candidates to state their 
position on the Constitution unequivocally.” (“The war over timing,” Olczyk, 
Bielecki, Śmiłowicz, Rzeczpospolita).21 
 
“Signing the Constitution for the European Union is a first step towards changing the 
identity of our continent. If the European nations don’t sober up and agree to ratify this 
                                                 
19 “Ze strony polskiej pod dokumentem podpisali się premier Marek Belka (52 l.) i szef dyplomacji 
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Kiedy szef rządu podpisywał konstytucję, jego żona Krystyna zwiedzała Rzym. 
Chodziła po ulicach Zatybrza - biednej, robotniczej dzielnicy Wiecznego Miasta.” 
20 “Mimo sprzeciwu większości partii opozycyjnych Rada Ministrów uchwaliła wczoraj zgodę na złożenie 
przez premiera podpisu pod konstytucją Unii Europejskiej, która ma stopić państwa narodowe w jedno 
europejskie superpaństwo.” 
 
21 “Miał być tekst, który poruszy, urzeknie, pomoże uświadomić Polakom, że należą do europejskiej rodziny. 
Powstała spisana biurokratycznym eurożargonem, trudna do zrozumienia instrukcja obsługi.” 
“Pomysł ten nie od dziś popiera lewica, która jednomyślnie opowiada się za przyjęciem przez Polskę 
konstytucji europejskiej. - Najlepiej, by referendum odbyło się przy pierwszej turze - mówi Marek Dyduch, 
sekretarz generalny SLD. - Wówczas wszyscy kandydaci na prezydenta będą musieli przedstawić jasne 
stanowisko wobec konstytucji europejskiej.” 
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‘cabinet Constitution,’ the funeral of Europe as we have traditionally understood it will 
become a fact.” (“Cabinet constitution,” Goss, Małgorzata, Nasz Dziennik).22  
 
“[The European Constitution] should not be the 1000-page-long babble of political 
psychopaths.” (“Readers judge,” SE, Super Express).23 
 
Finally, evaluative statements such as “important/unimportant” or “difficult/easy/neutral” 
were used rather rarely and usually only in very general contexts: 
 
“John Paul II said that the Treaty is “an extremely important moment in the building 
of a new Europe”. Unlike Polish politicians, he views the Constitution ‘with trust.’” 
(“After signing, before ratification,” Makowski and Sierakowski, Tygodnik 
Powszechny).24 
 
Equally and oppositely, the Constitution was also evaluated as unimportant: 
 
“Let’s put symbols to one side and ask ourselves whether the Constitution introduces 
anything new. Not really. In point of fact, it only repeats provisions from previous 
treaties, and these will not be annulled simply because the Constitution is blocked. 
Realistically speaking, the Constitution would change very little and its rejection is 
therefore not a catastrophe.”  (“The free market is good for us,” Gadomski, Witold, 
Rzeczpospolita; argument by Rostowski, Jacek).25 
 
The evaluative concept “difficult” was used predominantly in relation to the crisis 
following ratification failure, for instance: 
 
“Extracting the most important parts from the Constitution and treating them 
independently from the whole Treaty is too complicated.” (“Silence regarding the 
Constitution,” Pawlicki, Jacek, Gazeta Wyborcza).26 
 
                                                 
22 “Podpisanie konstytucji Unii Europejskiej to pierwszy etap na drodze do zmiany tożsamości naszego 
kontynentu. Jeśli narody europejskie nie otrzeźwieją i zgodzą się na ratyfikację tej "gabinetowej konstytucji" 
- pogrzeb tradycyjnie pojmowanej Europy stanie się faktem.” 
23 “[Konstytucja europejska] to nie może być 1000 stron bełkotu politycznych psychopatów.” 
24 “Jan Paweł II nazywa Traktat “niezwykle ważnym momentem w budowaniu nowej Europy”. I na 
Konstytucję, w przeciwieństwie do polskich polityków, “patrzy z ufnością”. 
25 “Zostawmy symbole na boku i zastanówmy się, co tak naprawdę nowego miała przynieść eurokonstytucja. 
Niewiele. W gruncie rzeczy powtarza ona zapisy obowiązujących już traktatów, które przecież nie zostaną 
unieważnione z tego powodu, że konstytucja została zablokowana. Realnie rzecz biorąc, konstytucja niewiele 
zmieniała i jej odrzucenie też nie jest katastrofą.” 
26 “Wyjęcie z konstytucji najważniejszych części i stosowanie ich niezależnie od traktatu jest zbyt 
skomplikowane.” 
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Neutral/undecided statements, though accounting for only two per cent of all statements, 
were most often used to present the Civic Platform’s position on the Constitution, for 
instance: 
 
“It is difficult to tell from the statements of the Civic Platform’s leaders whether the 
party is “for” or “against” the Constitution. The leader, Donald Tusk, said that a 
decision can be expected…at the earliest in spring next year (2006, A.W.). The 
largest opposition party, making up the shadow government, has no position on the 
European Constitution at all!” (“After signing, before ratification,” Sierakowski, 
Makowski, Tygodnik Powszechny).27 
 
 
II.4 Motives and justifications 
It is possible to identify some regularity with respect to the discourse of justifications and 
motives within the normative, electoral, and cross-border debates. Within the electoral 
debate, the dominant actors were political parties and journalists. Politicians were not very 
active themselves as far as writing editorials was concerned; therefore, their opinions were 
most often articulated and evaluated by journalists. As a consequence, the most popular 
motives that journalists identified on the part of political parties were vote-seeking and 
office-seeking. The politicians themselves, by contrast, tended to justify their position in 
terms of democratic values, participation, national or citizens’ interests, arguing, for 
instance, that organizing a referendum to coincide with the presidential elections was in the 
citizens’ best interests and would enhance democracy in Poland. Interestingly, while Polish 
domestic actors identified participation as the level of voter turn-out, the supranational 
ones conceptualized it widely as the degree of ‘citizens’ involvement’ in EU matters. 
 
Table 11: Types of justification. 
                                                 
27 “Trudno jednak z wypowiedzi liderów tej formacji dociec, czy PO jest “za” Konstytucją, czy “przeciw”. 
Szef Platformy Donald Tusk powiedział, że decyzji w tej sprawie należy się spodziewać... najwcześniej na 
wiosnę przyszłego roku.  Największa partia opozycyjna, formacja tworząca gabinet cieni nie ma 
wyrobionego zdania na temat unijnej Konstytucji!” 
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In the cross-border debate journalists or experts usually explained EU events or the 
outcome of the referenda in terms of lack of understanding between elites and citizens. In 
the normative debate, two patterns can be identified. Firstly, experts or journalists justified 
their positions on the Constitution in terms of their general visions of a liberal or social 
Europe. Within the normative debate a particular vision of Europe, treated either as a topic 
or cited as justification, was very often more important than the actual text of the 
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Constitution. The discussion over different visions of Europe revealed some transnational 
features. Poland stood in clear opposition to the French public which backed a social 
Europe. There were basically two positions on this issue among the Polish actors. Some 
argued that the Constitution indeed promoted a social Europe while others believed that the 
Constitution as such was neither social nor liberal but that voting was nonetheless guided 
by context issues such as the services directive or future accessions. And so the spectre of 
‘the Polish Plumber’28 haunted the heated discussions about the EU services directive. The 
split between proponents of a social and a liberal Europe has encouraged many Polish 
actors to advocate a Polish-British alliance for a liberal Europe against the French-German 
coalition for a social Europe. A long tradition of good political and economic relations 
between Poland and USA was also brought up by those actors wishing to attack the 
dominance of the Franco-German vision of Europe. These actors argued that Polish-
American relations would be negatively affected if the Franco-German vision of Europe 
were implemented. 
 
It is worth paying closer attention to the recurring idea of the Constitution as a Franco-
German product. Interestingly, the idea was propounded both by the quality press and 
Nasz Dziennik. In the quality press experts or journalist criticised the Constitution because 
it copied the French and the German model of a social state. The following quotations are 
extracts from the very thorough article published in Rzeczpospolita by Prof. Jacek 
Rostowski, Head of Economics at the Central European University. 
 
“The European Constitution was created by France and Germany in order to maintain 
their supremacy in the EU. The sweet revenge of the French, their ‘No’ to a European 
Constitution will force France to choose between the current state of stagnation and 
building a Europe where everybody has equal rights.”29 
 
“The greatest advantage to come from the French ‘No’ will be the collapse of the vision of 
European integration currently held by the French elite and which has been taken up in 
Germany, a vision which has led to the current state of stagnation throughout the whole 
continent. For the French elite Europe was conceived of as an enlarged France. […] It is 
seen as a transmission belt for French influence and as protecting the French job market 
from competition from East Central European states. It is supposed to be a political 
                                                 
28 The expression can be attributed to Frits Bolkestein. His invocation of the Polish plumber at a press 
conference on services directive made the expression so (in)famous. Soon the expression was taken over by 
the media in France but also other EU member states. In June 2005 the Polish tourist board in France came 
up the idea to use the well-known expression to combat what they perceived as a negative view of Poland. 
For the Internet advertisement they employed a Polish professional model who was inviting to Poland 
dressed in a plumber work-uniform. The commercial was widely recognized as a commercial and also 
political success.  
29 “Konstytucję europejską wymyśliły Francja i Niemcy, aby zachować supremację w UE Słodka zemsta 
Francuzów ‘Nie’ dla konstytucji europejskiej zmusi Francję do wyboru między pozostaniem przy obecnym 
stanie integracji a budowaniem Europy, w której wszyscy mają takie same prawa.” 
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Europe, but not integrated to the extent that other countries could impose anything on 
France.”30 
 
“The French ‘No’ will lead to the rejection of the Constitution in other countries such as 
the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, and certainly Great Britain. The French ‘No’ 
means the death of the Constitution leaving us with the Nice Treaty which is beneficial for 
Poland.” (“The sweet revenge of the French,” Rostowski, Jacek, Rzeczpospolita) 31 
 
 
For authors writing in the quality press, the French-German alliance was a reason to reject 
the Constitution and opt for staying with the Nice system, which was better from the 
perspective of Polish economic and political interests. Importantly, these authors were not 
against the EU or Polish membership thereof, rather, they argued that an EU functioning 
according to the Nice system would have a more positive impact on the member states’ 
economies while ensuring that Poland had a stronger political position in EU institutions. 
In Nasz Dziennik, France and Germany were accused of attempting to dominate other 
member states politically. For Nasz Dziennik these attempts were often seen as sufficient 
reason to argue against the Polish membership in the EU. However, it should also be borne 
in mind that the authors of these claims made many factual errors or used terminology 
incorrectly. Moreover, they were not consistent and changed their minds on the Polish 
membership in the EU from one article to the next. The following examples illustrate that: 
 
“‘Union’ is constantly out there as a subject. But what is ‘Union’? Some anonymous 
deity? Something set down in the ancient law code of Hammurabi? Perhaps we should 
consider that it might in fact be an old German-French ghost conjured up by the oligarchic 
utopists copying Karl Marx” (“What do the basic laws of the EU promise?” Fr. Bartnik, 
Nasz Dziennik).32 
 
“And so  the utopian convictions of the atheist mind have evolved into an incredible 
nightmare and imprisonment [namely, the Constitution]. It needs to be stressed once 
again: cooperation and free cooperation [i.e. cooperation with the EU as an external 
                                                 
30 “Najważniejszą korzyścią z francuskiego "nie" będzie upadek wizji integracji europejskiej, którą mają elity 
francuskie i która zaraziła także Niemcy, a powoduje obecną stagnację całego kontynentu. Dla elit 
francuskich Europa ma być rozszerzoną Francją. […] Ma być pasem transmisyjnym dla wpływów 
francuskich i chronić francuskie miejsca pracy przed konkurencją krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Ma 
byćEuropą polityczną, ale nie zintegrowaną politycznie do takiego stopnia, by inne kraje mogły Francji 
cokolwiek narzucić.” 
31 “Francuskie ‘nie’ zapewne pociągnie za sobą odrzucenie konstytucji w innych krajach, jak Holandia i 
Czechy, a już na pewno w Wielkiej Brytanii. ‘Nie’ francuskie to śmierć konstytucji i pozostanie przy 
korzystnym dla Polski traktacie z Nicei.” 
32 “W tekstach ustawicznie jako podmiot występuje ‘Unia’. Co to jest ‘Unia’? Jakieś anonimowe bóstwo? Z 
Kodeksu Hammurabiego? Należy się obawiać, że to jest dawny Duch Germano-Francji, uosobiony w 
potężnych oligarchach utopistach, naśladujących Karola Marksa.” 
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partner]!: yes But a German-French colonial empire: no!” (“The euro-constitution takes 
away our freedom,” Fr. Bartnik, Nasz Dziennik).33 
 
In an article published just  two weeks before, the same author had argued: 
 
“The worst thing is that the whole ideology of the new Europe, its intellectual and cultural 
context, was hijacked in Maastricht by atheists and free masons - French, Belgian, 
German, British and Jewish. They have cut themselves off from the influence of the 
Catholic Church and, most of all, from the Pope.” (“The good and bad aims of the 
Union,” Fr. Bartnik, Nasz Dziennik).34 
 
“Certainly, the economic, military, defense and political union [!!!] has been truly 
meaningful but not the ideological and monarchial union based on atheism and anti-
Christianity. It is a historical mistake and a caricature of the real Europe. The engineers of 
the Union, especially after Maastricht in 1992, have added bad totalitarian and atheistic 
goals to the original good aims of the Union. This will have a fatal outcome. (“The good 
and bad aims of the Union,” Fr. Bartnik, Nasz Dziennik).35 
 
In the normative debate, a second pattern emerges involving public opinion data before and 
after the French “No”. Before the referendum in France, journalists and experts pointed to 
the fact that support for the Constitution was a result of a “logic of consequentiality”. As 
the public survey analysis has shown, the majority of Poles were in favour of the 
Constitution (56% of all respondents). When asked to justify their opinion, 47% of 
constitutional supporters said they would vote “Yes” because they supported Polish 
membership of the EU. What was also quite telling was that 23% justified their opinion by 
saying that it is necessary to vote for the Constitution because a Polish “No” could have a 
negative impact on the country. Only 15% of those supporting the Constitution said they 
did so because its provisions were good for Poland. On the other hand, 44% of the 
Constitution’s opponents decided to vote against it because it was not of benefit to Poland. 
Among them 25% gave the lack of reference to Christian values in the preamble as a 
reason.36. The social survey conducted after the French and Dutch “no-vote” established 
                                                 
33 “I tak utopijna wiara w bezbożny rozum przeradza się w niespotykany koszmar i zniewolenie. Trzeba 
podkreślić jeszcze raz: współpraca i wolna wspólnota tak! Jedno zaś germańsko-frankońskie imperium 
kolonialne - nie!” 
34 “Najgorsze, że całą ideologię nowej Europy, i konteksty umysłowe, i kulturalne, przejęli w Maastricht 
ateiści i masoni - francuscy, belgijscy, holenderscy, niemieccy, angielscy, w tym i żydowscy. Odsunęli oni 
od wpływów Kościół katolicki, a szczególnie papiestwo.” 
35 “Oczywiście, miała i ma głęboki sens unia gospodarcza, militarna, obronna i polityczna, ale unia 
ideologiczna i mocarstwowa, oparta na ateizmie i antychrześcijaństwie, nie ma żadnego sensu. Jest 
historyczną pomyłką i karykaturą prawdziwej Europy. Inżynierowie Unii, zwłaszcza po Maastricht 1992 
roku, do dobrych celów pierwotnych dołączyli nierozumnie złe cele typu totalitarnego i ateistycznego. To 
zapowiada fatalny koniec.” 
 
36 CBOS, “Poles on the European Constitution” (Polacy o Konstytucji Europejskiej), report based on data 
from the social survey, Warsaw, April 2005. 
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that 47% of all respondents could not say if the French and Dutch rejection of the Treaty 
was good or bad. According to the same survey, 78% of respondents deemed their 
knowledge of the Constitution to be “insufficient” and only 15% claimed to have adequate 
knowledge of the subject. This would explain why Poles could not say whether the French 
and Dutch “No” was good or bad. Moreover, having insufficient knowledge about the text 
of the Constitution, the Polish public was more susceptible to the forward-looking 
justifications appearing in that context. Voting “Yes” to the Constitution was in their view 
a natural logical progression from their “Yes” vote in the accession referendum. On the 
other hand, constitutional opponents often remained in favour of Polish membership in the 
EU but did not want to deepen integration, and rejection of the Constitution was a way of 
signalling that preference. 
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Table 12: Top 10 justifications. 
 
 
 
III. Synthesis 
Through our print media analysis, we have identified three strands in the debate on the 
Constitutional Treaty in Poland: normative, electoral and cross-border. Actors discussing 
the Constitution within the framework of the normative debate were mostly interested in 
general visions of Europe enshrined in the Treaty. Interestingly, the Constitution was often 
associated with conflicting visions, for instance, ‘liberal’, ‘social’, ‘atheist’ or 
‘multicultural’. Therefore, the arguments “for” and “against” were often used not in 
relation to the Treaty as such but rather in relation to a particular vision of Europe which 
the Constitution was believed to promote. Polish actors were either against the social 
vision of Europe or they argued that Constitution as such did not promote either a social or 
a liberal Europe although people tended to view it through the lense of context issues 
nonetheless. 
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Table 13: Dimensions of europeanization. 
 
DIRECTION/QUALITY COVERAGE 
CONTEXT 
VISIBILITY OF 
ELITES AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
VISIBILITY OF 
CITIZENS AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
JUSTIFICATIONS 
NATIONAL ELECTORAL DEBATE: 
PARLIAMENTARY AND 
PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS 
1.POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
2.NATIONAL MEDIA 
NO PARTIES: 
DEMOCRACY  
 
MEDIA: VOTE AND 
OFFICE SEEKING 
(ATTRIBUTED TO 
PARTIES) 
TRANSNATIONAL CROSS-BORDER 
DEBATE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEBATES/REFERENDA 
IN OTHER M-S 
1.EXECUTIVES 
 
2.TOP EU OFFICIALS 
FOREIGN 
PUBLIC/VOTERS 
1.INTEREST BASED 
 
2.ELITE-CITIZENS 
LINK 
EUROPEAN NORMATIVE DEBATE: 
VISION OF THE EU  
1.MEDIA 
 
2.EXPERTS/ACADEMICS 
 
POLISH PUBLIC 
(PASSIVE) 
1.SOCIAL/LIBERAL 
EU 
2.POLITICIZATION 
(NATIONAL 
INTERESTS V. EU 
INTERESTS AND 
DEMOCRACY AT EU 
LEVEL) 
 
In the electoral debate the Constitution was employed predominantly as a vote-seeking or 
office-securing device within an exclusively domestic context. In short, it was expected to 
enhance political actors’ position in the elections. The central issue for the political parties 
became the timing of the Constitutional referendum and the question of whether it should 
be scheduled to coincide with the presidential or parliamentary elections. 
 
The Polish cross-border debate provided information on the domestic profile of 
constitutional discussions taking place in other EU states. The media reported and 
evaluated key constitutional events or arguments raised in other member states. Although 
the visibility of external actors was fairly high in the Polish discussion, only a limited 
number of arguments were taken up by the Polish actors. In most cases the Polish media 
merely gave an account of an event or a discussion without actively responding to the 
foreign actors’ arguments. 
 
 
The following table shows the various levels of transnationalization in the Polish 
constitutional debate. The lowest level being visibility, the second, reaction to arguments, 
and the third, exchange of argumentation. 
 
Table 14: Levels of transnationalization. 
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Type of a Debate Degree of Transnationalization
 
Electoral debate No transnationalization 
Cross-border debate  Visibility 
EU normative model debate Reaction to arguments 
 
The attitude toward EU membership is a useful aid to mapping the constitutional 
discourses in the various member states. In Poland a strict division between those in favour 
of and those against European integration was not observed during the period of research 
but rather something that might best be described as ‘fuzzy EU opposition’. The results of 
our analysis of print media in Poland showed that the populist-catholic daily Nasz Dziennik 
published opinions both in favour of Polish membership in the EU and against it. 
Furthermore, these diametrically opposed statements came from a single author and were 
penned in the space of only two weeks. The author was strongly in favour of the idea of 
European integration and traced it back to the medieval idea of a ‘Europe united in Christ’. 
He also supported market integration and promotion of democratic values. But elsewhere 
he was against the Constitution, which he believed was taking away states’ sovereign 
powers. The ‘Union’ which he therefore advocated was a common market union of 
sovereign nation-states. In another article published within two weeks of this one, the same 
author was arguing against EU membership saying that Poland would be ‘better-off’ 
without the Union which was nothing more than a Franco-German conspiracy. 
Interestingly, he claimed to support politicization of the Union, but not an ‘EU-empire’. It 
needs to be noted that this inconsistent voice was an exception not only in the whole print 
media sample but also in Nasz Dziennik. Other authors writing for this daily were openly 
against the Constitution but in favour of the EU and remained very consistent in their 
position. Nasz Dziennik is related to the radical party of so-called ‘fighting Catholicism’: 
The League of Polish Families, which was against the EU membership during the pre-
accession period. However, after accession the party has gradually come to terms with 
Polish membership of the EU. Therefore, in the period of research there was no longer any 
party on the Polish political scene which opposed EU membership. Only in their attitude 
towards the Constitution could a political divide be discerned. 
 
The figure below maps Polish discourse on Constitution: 
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Figure 2: European political discourse in Poland. 
 
      
 
 
SLD-Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, The Left-wing Alliance (left) 
PO- Platforma Obywatelska, The Civic Platform (center, liberal) 
PIS- Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Law and Justice (right) 
S- Samoobrona, Self-defense (populist) 
LPR- Liga Polskich Rodzin, The League of Polish Families (radical ‘fighting’ Catholicism) 
 
 
During the Constitutional debate the vertical axis ‘more politicization/withdrawal’ was 
more important than the horizontal. The market/welfare dimension of the EU did not 
divide Polish actors. There was a consensus between the parties and social actors that 
Poland and the Poles needed Europe because it would provide open markets for the Polish 
labour force, breaking down social barriers. They saw it as competitive and enhancing 
economic growth in all member states. Interestingly, even the experts’ arguments were 
very ‘down-to-earth’, taking the perspective of the individual Polish worker (that of the 
now infamous and ‘representative’ Polish plumber) as well as that of Polish companies. In 
fact, many authors argued against a welfare Europe saying that it would result in the 
economic stagnation already evident in France and Germany. 
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To some external observers it came as a surprise that the largest right-wing party in Poland, 
Law and Justice, won the elections under the banner of ‘social solidarity’ while at the same 
time remaining against the Constitution and an opponent of extended welfare arrangements 
in the EU.37 From the party perspective, this did not constitute a paradox. Law and Justice 
is against deep politicization of the EU. The party believes that solidarity functions at a 
national level only. Furthermore, no political party in Poland supports extended welfare 
arrangements at EU level such as harmonization of taxation or social benefits set according 
to Western-European criteria. Many experts such as Prof. Rostowski were therefore against 
a social vision of Europe exclusively on the basis of economic considerations. 
 
The parties that opposed the particular project of the Constitution were not necessarily 
against constitutionalization in general. With the current government the question remains 
open. Although President Kaczyński envisages the EU as a union of nation-states, his 
political party and Poland’s governing party, Law and Justice, recently indicated that it 
would be willing to discuss a new constitutional project. As a consequence, in the future 
the PIS may move up the vertical axis towards ‘politicization’. The same holds true for the 
Civic Platform, PO, which seems not to be against politicization of the EU in general. 
 
We can identify some general characteristics as far as the patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion of particular actors are concerned. Firstly, the diversity of national and foreign 
actors involved in the discussion was rather low, which in turn resulted in limited diversity 
in terms of the issues raised in the national debate. Secondly, the public as actor did not set 
the agenda in Poland, and, as such the constitutional process remained very elitist and 
detached from citizens. Low personalisation was another striking feature of the Polish 
debate. Although the various parties made their positions on the Constitution clear, 
individual politicians, especially constitutional proponents, were not interested in initiating 
national debate or in bringing the Constitution closer to the Polish citizens. The issue of the 
constitutional referendum, discussed predominantly within the framework of the electoral 
debate, fell hostage to domestic politics. 
 
Had the referendum taken place before the French “No”, Polish citizens would very 
probably have cast their votes in favour of the Constitution, regardless of whether the 
referendum had coincided with the national elections or taken place separately.38 Had the 
referendum taken place after the French “No”, the outcome would be less certain. Poles 
felt “lost” when the French and the Dutch rejected the Constitution. In the light of social 
survey data, people were ready to support the Constitution because they believed it to be 
the next logical step in the integration process. The French and Dutch rejections have 
undermined the Poles’ faith in this inexorable logic, prompting them to view the 
Constitution with greater suspicion. If the Polish referendum had taken place after the 
                                                 
37 Or simply ignored the issue in the parliamentary and presidential campaign.  
38 In the light of social survey research.  
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French, the turn-out probably would not have been sufficient to ratify the Constitution in a 
referendum. It is probable that the new right-wing parliamentary majority will vote against 
this particular Constitution, unless it becames the subject of economic intergovernmental 
bargaining. Given this instrumental approach to the Constitution it is not unthinkable that 
the new government may trade this Constitution for political or economic gain or, 
alternatively, endorse another project for the same strategic reasons39. 
 
Conclusions. 
The Polish constitutional discussion was shaped by three different debates, involving 
different actors and encouraging different “perceptions” of the Constitution. Most often, 
the Constitution was perceived in the Polish discussion either as a vote-seeking device or 
as a document promoting a particular ideology or vision of Europe; be it social or liberal. 
The electoral debate was dominated by journalists and politicians who employed the 
Constitution as a vote-garnering strategy. By means of the cross-border debate journalists 
and experts introduced foreign national discussions to the Polish public. The normative 
debate provided the space for discussing and critically evaluating competing visions of 
Europe. That debate has also affected public opinion very strongly. According to social 
survey data, Poles supported the Constitution because of a “logic of consequentiality”. 
According to social surveys quoted in the media, Poles did not feel competent enough to 
assess constitutional provisions. Yet, the majority was willing to vote for the Constitution, 
justifying their decision in terms of a general vision of a united Europe, of which Poland 
had become an integral part. Obviously, the fact that the Polish public knew little about the 
constitutional text is alarming. Conscious decisions should be based on adequate 
knowledge, which the Poles by their own admission do not have. Because de facto public 
debate did not take place in Poland, the public knew little about the Constitution and was 
unable to assess whether the Nice Treaty or Constitution best reflected their vision of the 
EU. Empirical information on voters’ preferences with regard to Nice or an EU 
Constitution is basically non-existent. The national position was determined at an elite 
level and neither the provisions of the Nice Treaty nor the Constitution seriously entered 
the electoral agenda. This has led to a paradoxical situation whereby the political 
representatives have decided on an issue for which they were not elected. The 
constitutional process in the EU was envisaged as a ‘pouvoir constituent mixte,’ which is to 
say one involving both the member states and their citizens. In Poland, then, one of the 
basic requirements of the process, namely, involvement of the people, was not fulfilled. 
Instrumentalization of the Constitution in the electoral discourse has only trivialized the 
issue while at the same time wasting the opportunity to initiate worthwhile public 
discussion. 
 
 
                                                 
39 In spring 2006 we already witnessed some attempts of this kind. 
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Appendix.  
 
The initial sample of daily newpapers was selected using the Factiva database search 
engine; however, since the data for the Polish dailies was not complete, additional searches 
were conducted in the archives of the dailies. None of the weeklies were available in 
Factiva, therefore, these articles were obtained from the archives. The search-terms were 
the following: “Union’s Constitution”, “European Constitution”, “Constitution for 
Europe”, “Euro-constitution” and “Constitutional Treaty”.40  
 
For the detailed analysis, 29 substantive articles were selected. The selection strategy was 
three-fold; from the articles published between October 2004 and October 2005, the 
selected sample was proportional to the media coverage in each month. The sample was 
composed of articles that were substantive or very relevant to the domestic discussion. In 
order to make sure that   the articles are relevant and  allowing for comparison with the 
other country studies, the selection also covers the following EU-events: signing of the 
constitutional treaty in Rome (Oct 2004), the Spanish referendum (Feb 2005), the French 
referendum (May 2005), the Dutch referendum (July), the Luxembourg referendum (July), 
the Luxembourg presidency summit, the reflection period (September), the British EU 
presidency summit or Blair speech in EP (September) and parliamentary ratification of the 
EU constitution in the country under study. 
 
                                                 
40 In Polish the search terms were: Konstytucja Unijna, Europejska Konstytucja, Konstytucja dla Europy, 
Eurokonstytucja, Traktat Konstytucyjny. 
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Appendix 1: Sample articles 
 
Title of the Article Author Author’s function/affiliation 
1. “British Media Miss the Poles” Borowiec, Aneta Journalist, Gazeta Wyborcza 
2. “Euroborrelionza: Ten Illnesses that 
Could Kill Europe” 
Nowakowski, JM Journalist, Wprost 
3. “Eurocatastrophy or a Polish 
Messiah”  
Nowina-Konopka, Piotr Journalist, Newsweek Polska 
4. “Like a Poor Instruction Manual” Bielecki, Jędrzej Journalist, Rzeczpospolita 
5. “How to save the Constitution”  Gadomski, Witold Journalist, Gazeta Wyborcza 
6. “Constitution: Weak “Yes” “ Stankiewicz, Andrzej Journalist, Rzeczpospolita 
7. “Space-Constitution” Gwiazdowski, Robert Journalist, Wprost 
8. “Something from Europe, for Europe 
nothing” 
Graczyk, Roman Journalist, Tygodnik Powszechny 
9. “After Signing, Before Ratification” Makowski, Jarosław; Sierakowski 
Sławomir 
Journalist, Tygodnik Powszechny 
10. “Free-riding Translation” Bieliecki, Jędrzej Journalist, Wprost 
11. “A Thousand Corrections and only 
one Was Proper” 
Konrad, Niklewicz Journalist, Gazeta Wyborcza 
12. “The People’s Organ” Paulukiewicz, Andrzej Journalist, Wprost 
13. “The Constitution is Dead- Long 
Live Europe” 
Osica, Paweł Academic, Tygodnik Powszechny 
14. “The War over Timing”  Olczyk, Eliza; Bielecki, Jędrzej; 
Smilowicz, Piotr  
Journalists, Rzeczpospolita 
15. „The Free Market is Good for us” Gadomski, Witold Journalist, Rzeczpospolita 
16. “The Bastille of the XXIst Century”  Kedaj, Waldemar Journalist, Wprost 
17. “French Trouble”  Sołtyk, Jerzy; Pszczółkowska, Dominika Journalists, Gazeta Wyborcza 
18. “The Liberal-Democratic Vision of 
Europe”  
Watson, Graham EP, Gazeta Wyborcza 
19. “Luxembourg Says “Yes” “ RS Journalist, Gazeta Wyborcza 
20. “Silence over the Constitution” Pawlicki, Jacek Journalist, Gazeta Wyborcza 
21. “Spain. Constitutional Referendum: 
“Yes” but no Crouds at the Ballot Box” 
AFP, RS Journalist, Gazeta Wyborcza 
22. “New Europe” Magierowski, Marek Journalist, Newsweek Polska 
23. “Spain Said “Yes” to the European 
Constitution” 
Wysocka, Ewa Journalist, Rzeczpospolita 
24. “The Sweet Revenge of the French” Rostowski, Jacek Academic, Rzeczpospolita 
25. “The Parties’ or the Citizens’ 
Referendum?” 
Cichocki, Marek A Academic, Rzeczpospolita 
26.  “Europe without a Constitution” Żiżek, Slavoj Academic, Fakt: Europa (supplement) 
27.  “France will say ‘No’?” Godlewski, Krzysztof Journalist, Super Express 
28.  “A Cabinet Constitution” Goss, Małgorzata Journalist, Nasz Dziennik 
29.  “The Euro-constitution takes away 
our Freedom” 
Bartnik, Czeslaw Priest and academic, Nasz Dziennik 
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Appendix 2: Media Coverage, Articles per Month  
 
Month no. % sample no. % sample no. % sample no. % sample no. % sample no. % sample no. % sample no. % sample no. % sample
04 10 1 4.8 0.0 2 0.7 0.1 3 8.6 0.1 0 0.0 0.0 2 0.8 0.1 1 14.3 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 9 1.3 0.4
04 11 2 9.5 0.1 8 2.7 0.3 2 5.7 0.1 1 4.5 0.0 22 8.5 0.9 1 14.3 0.0 1 4.3 0.0 2 5.9 0.1 39 5.6 1.6
04 12 0 0.0 0.0 15 5.0 0.6 0 0.0 0.0 4 18.2 0.2 13 5.0 0.5 0 0.0 0.0 3 13.0 0.1 2 5.9 0.1 37 5.3 1.5
05 01 1 4.8 0.0 17 5.7 0.7 1 2.9 0.0 2 9.1 0.1 20 7.7 0.8 1 14.3 0.0 1 4.3 0.0 2 5.9 0.1 45 6.4 1.9
05 02 0 0.0 0.0 17 5.7 0.7 10 28.6 0.4 4 18.2 0.2 13 5.0 0.5 0 0.0 0.0 1 4.3 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 45 6.4 1.9
05 03 2 9.5 0.1 27 9.1 1.1 3 8.6 0.1 2 9.1 0.1 18 6.9 0.7 0 0.0 0.0 2 8.7 0.1 5 14.7 0.2 59 8.4 2.4
05 04 0 0.0 0.0 28 9.4 1.2 0 0.0 0.0 1 4.5 0.0 24 9.3 1.0 0 0.0 0.0 2 8.7 0.1 6 17.6 0.2 61 8.7 2.5
05 05 2 9.5 0.1 60 20.1 2.5 5 14.3 0.2 1 4.5 0.0 54 20.8 2.2 2 28.6 0.1 3 13.0 0.1 6 17.6 0.2 133 19.0 5.5
05 06 7 33.3 0.3 76 25.5 3.2 9 25.7 0.4 3 13.6 0.1 50 19.3 2.1 2 28.6 0.1 3 13.0 0.1 6 17.6 0.2 156 22.3 6.5
05 07 1 4.8 0.0 13 4.4 0.5 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 17 6.6 0.7 0 0.0 0.0 1 4.3 0.0 1 2.9 0.0 33 4.7 1.4
05 08 3 14.3 0.1 8 2.7 0.3 1 2.9 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 8 3.1 0.3 0 0.0 0.0 1 4.3 0.0 1 2.9 0.0 22 3.1 0.9
05 09 1 4.8 0.0 15 5.0 0.6 1 2.9 0.0 2 9.1 0.1 7 2.7 0.3 0 0.0 0.0 3 13.0 0.1 1 2.9 0.0 30 4.3 1.2
05 10 1 4.8 0.0 12 4.0 0.5 0 0.0 0.0 2 9.1 0.1 11 4.2 0.5 0 0.0 0.0 2 8.7 0.1 2 5.9 0.1 30 4.3 1.2
Total 21 1 298 12 35 1 22 1 259 11 7 0 23 1 34 1 699 29
Fakt/Europa Nasz Dziennik Super ExpressGazeta Wyborcza Newsweek Rzeczpospolita TP Wprost All newspapers
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Appendix 3: Media Information  
 
Name 
(in Polish) 
Political orientation 
 
Ownership Circulation rate 
(31.12.2004) 
aprox. 
Source/search engine Total 
no. of articles 
No. of articles in 
qualitative sample 
Dailies Gazeta Wyborcza center-left  Agora SA 500.000 Factiva, GW archives 298 8 
 Rzeczpospolita center-right PRESSPUBLICA sp. z 
o.o. 
240.000 Factiva, Rz archives 259 7 
 Super Express tabloid Tidnings AB 
Marieberg 
300.000 Super Express, archives 7 1 
Special 
Supplement 
EUROPA: supplement of 
FAKT 
tabloid Axel Springer 750.000 Fakt: archives 21 1 
Weeklies Wprost right AWR "Wprost" 304.000 Archives of Wprost 31 5 
 Newsweek Polska Left Axel Springer 140.000 Archives of Newsweek 22 2 
Sectoral 
populist 
Tygodnik Powszechny  right, catholic Tygodnik Powszechny 
spółka z o.o. 
38.000 Archives of TP 23 3 
 Nasz Dziennik Sectoral daily: 
populists catholic 
Spes, spolka z o.o 150.000 Data base of ND 35 2 
Total      699 29 
 
